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Supreme Court to Suspects: Speak Up for Your Miranda Rights -- Be Silent!

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Every fan of police dramas knows the routine. As a suspect is being arrested, police officers slap the cuffs on and say, "You have the right to remain silent. Anything you say can and will be used against you in a court of law ... " In some scenes, after they go through the whole routine, including the right to counsel, an officer will say something like, "Do you understand these rights as I have explained them to you?" eliciting a nod or a grunt of assent. 

The speech is known as the Miranda warning, based on the landmark 1966 Supreme Court case of Miranda v. Arizona. The High Court ruled that failing to advise people in custody of their rights to counsel and to silence during police interrogation violates their Fifth Amendment rights against self-incrimination

U.S. Supreme Court takes portrait in Washington

But real life arrests don't go as smoothly as the collars on TV. Sometimes it's not clear whether the defendant has invoked the right to silence, nor is it always clear what police can do when faced with a taciturn defendant. Case in point: the 2001 arrest of Van Chester Thompkins in connection with a drive-by shooting that killed one man and wounded another.  Southfield, Michigan police officers recited Thompkins' Miranda rights, and Thompkins read one of the warnings aloud, indicating that he could read and understand English. However, he did not explicitly waive or invoke his Miranda rights. According to Lyle Denniston's summary on the Supreme Court (SCOTUS) wiki, after three hours of questioning the cops asked whether Thompkins sought God's forgiveness for "shooting that boy down." Thompkins said, "Yes." That answer was introduced in court as evidence against him, and he was convicted on all counts and sentenced to life without parole.

Thompkins' new attorneys appealed on the grounds that the statement was inadmissible. They also said his counsel had been ineffective. Last November, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals threw out his conviction, arguing that the police interrogation should have stopped until Thompkins explicitly invoked or waived his rights. 

U.S. Supreme Court Justices Pose For Group Photo

In a 5-4 ruling, the U.S. Supreme Court declared June 1 that unless criminal suspects explicitly invoke their right to remain silent during a police interrogation,  anything they say can be used against them. Writing for the majority, Associate Justice Anthony Kennedy declared:

In sum, a suspect who has received and understood the Miranda warnings, and has not invoked his Mirandarights, waives the right to remain silent by making an uncoerced statement to the police. Thompkins did not invoke his right to remain silent and stop the questioning. Understanding his rights in full, he waived his right to remain silent by making a voluntary statement to the police. The police, moreover, were not required to obtain a waiver of Thompkins’s right to remain silent before interrogating him.

The Court's conservative wing -- Justices Alito, Roberts, Scalia and Thomas -- voted with Kennedy.  

U.S. Supreme Court takes portrait in Washington

In a sharply worded dissent endorsed by Justices Breyer, Ginzburg, and Stephens,  Associate Justice Sonia Sotomayor argued that the Court's decision "turns Miranda upside-down."  She further argued:

...Advising a suspect that he has a "right to remain silent" is unlikely to convey that he must speak (and must do so in some particular fashion) to ensure the right will be protected. ... By contrast, telling a suspect “he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires,” Miranda  384 U. S., at 479, implies the need for speech to exercise that right. Davis ’  requirement that a suspect must “clearly reques[t] an attorney” to terminate questioning thus aligns with a suspect’s likely understanding of the Miranda warnings in a way today’s rule does not. The Court suggests Thompkins could have employed the "simple, unambiguous" means of saying “he wanted to remain silent” or "did not want to talk with the police." Ante , at 10. But the Miranda warnings give no hint that a suspect should use those magic words, and there is little reason to believe police -— who have ample incentives to avoid invocation -— will provide such guidance.

Conversely, the Court’s concern that police will face "difficult decisions about an accused’s unclear intent" and suffer the consequences

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Kim Pearson 5 pts

Yes, you are right about Kagan. There's a long history of Justices voting differently than one might have thought based on their writings or deeds before appointment to to Court. And as you say, Kagan's work as a clerk for Thurgood Marshall, or as solicitor general required her to look at the law from perspectives that might not have been her own. Still there's plenty of fodder there for the Judiciary Committee to question her about, so it will be interesting to see how she responds.

Kim Pearson
BlogHer Contributing Editor ( http://blogher.org/blog/kim-pearson )|KimPearson.net ( http://kimpearson.net )|

ebyrdstarr 5 pts

I do think the people who are most likely to get caught by this new ruling are those who are most likely to falsely confess. It's disheartening to see courts continue to keep their heads in the sand about systemic problems that lead to wrongful convictions. The DNA exoneration wave has given us such great information about the kinds of failures that lead to wrongful convictions. Yet courts still resist improving eyewitness identifications, police interrogations, responses to prosecutorial misconduct. This was an opportunity for the Supreme Court to recognize the real threat of false confessions, but the court blew it. Big time. I cannot emphasize enough just how damaging I fear this opinion will be.

As for Kagan, I really don't know what to make of her. It is too difficult to suss out her true stance on things. We shouldn't assume how she would rule on things based on how she might argue to the courts as an advocate for the Justice Department. Her job was to defend convictions they have obtained. But then again, if I were ever up for an appellate judgeship, one could probably get a pretty accurate sense of how I would vote on things if they read all of the appellate briefs I have written advocating for my clients.

Preaching to the Choir ( http://rantsofapublicdefender.blogspot.com/ )

Kim Pearson 5 pts

I think that Sotomayor clarified the issue for me when she said that the majority is assuming that every suspect will know the magic words to conjure up. I've read elsewhere that the people who will fare best under this decision are in fact career criminals who will learn how to play the game. Others are more likely to get the script wrong because they are inexperienced with the criminal justice system, nervous, and scared. Under such circumstances, I can see how the chance for false confessions will be high.

As a former prosecutor with a reputation of ruling favorably toward police, one might have had reason to believe that Sotomayor might have held some sway. C'est la vie. Had Kagan been on the court, it's possible that the majority would have been even greater.

Kim Pearson
BlogHer Contributing Editor ( http://blogher.org/blog/kim-pearson )|KimPearson.net ( http://kimpearson.net )|

ebyrdstarr 5 pts

Caveat: defense lawyer here. But I find this decision to be very troubling and shows the majority of the court to be very far removed from the reality facing most criminal suspects. Sotomayor's dissent is definitely the better reasoned opinion. How I wish she had gathered one more vote.

The idea that a suspect needs to invoke her right to remain silent seems innocuous enough, but the shift here from requiring the state to prove a waiver of the right to presuming a waiver absent some explicit pronouncement by the suspect is significant. In a long line of cases, courts have routinely labeled statements that normal people might consider invocations to be "ambiguous". But people in actual conversation just don't speak in the unequivocal phrases courts would recognize as sufficiently clear, especially when talking to authority figures like cops.

I think this opinion has put the non-existent "right" of police to interrogate suspects ahead of the actual Fifth Amendment right of suspects not to be compelled to be witnesses against themselves. And I think it turns a blind eye to the very real problem of false confessions. I've seen estimates between 18 and 30% of wrongful conviction cases involve false confessions. There is an infamous case in Texas, the Yogurt Shoppe murders, where police interrogations have led as many as 50 people to confess.

This opinion was badly done by the majority and will do much more damage than people are willing to acknowledge.
Preaching to the Choir ( http://rantsofapublicdefender.blogspot.com/ )